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Re: You've heard it all before so here it is again

Posted by Joe on 2/8/2006, 10:01 pm, in reply to "Re: You've heard it all before so here it is again"
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Funny Ron, the so called public opinion was a minority of big mouths supported entirely by the media. If you feel college kids and talking heads in the media are mainstream public opinion go for it. --Previous Message-- : Yeah, it is so true, that is the biggest : weakness of Democracy. The elected leaders : are subject to public opinion. : : --Previous Message-- : Interview of Bui Tin conducted by Stephen : Young : "How North Vietnam Won the War," : Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995, page - : A8 : : : What did the North Vietnamese leadership : think of the American antiwar movement? : : : What was the purpose of the Tet Offensive? : : : How could the U.S. have been more successful : in fighting the Vietnam War? : : : Bui Tin, a former colonel in the North : Vietnamese army, answers these questions in : the following excerpts from an interview : conducted by Stephen Young, a Minnesota : attorney and human-rights activist. : : : Bui Tin, who served on the general staff of : North Vietnam's army, received the : unconditional surrender of South Vietnam on : April 30, 1975. : : : He later became editor of the People's : Daily, the official newspaper of Vietnam. He : now lives in Paris, where he immigrated : after becoming disillusioned with the fruits : of Vietnamese communism. : : : Question: How did Hanoi intend to defeat the : Americans? : : : Answer: By fighting a long war which would : break their will to help South Vietnam. Ho : Chi Minh said, "We don't need to win : military victories, we only need to hit them : until they give up and get out." : : : Q: Was the American antiwar movement : important to Hanoi's victory? : : : A: It was essential to our strategy. Support : of the war from our rear was completely : secure while the American rear was : vulnerable. Every day our leadership would : listen to world news over the radio at 9 : a.m. to follow the growth of the American : antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people : like Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General : Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us : confidence that we should hold on in the : face of battlefield reverses. We were elated : when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese : dress, said at a press conference that she : was ashamed of American actions in the war : and that she would struggle along with us. : : : Q: Did the Politburo pay attention to these : visits? : : : A: Keenly. : : : Q: Why? : : : A: Those people represented the conscience : of America. The conscience of America was : part of its war-making capability, and we : were turning that power in our favor. : America lost because of its democracy; : through dissent and protest it lost the : ability to mobilize a will to win. : : : Q: How could the Americans have won the war? : : : A: Cut the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Laos. If : Johnson had granted [Gen. William] : Westmoreland's requests to enter Laos and : block the Ho Chi Minh trail, Hanoi could not : have won the war. : : : Q: Anything else? : : : A: Train South Vietnam's generals. The : junior South Vietnamese officers were good, : competent and courageous, but the commanding : general officers were inept. : Q: Did Hanoi expect that the National : Liberation Front would win power in South : Vietnam? : : : A: No. Gen. [Vo Nguyen] Giap [commander of : the North Vietnamese army] believed that : guerrilla warfare was important but not : sufficient for victory. Regular military : divisions with artillery and armor would be : needed. The Chinese believed in fighting : only with guerrillas, but we had a different : approach. The Chinese were reluctant to help : us. Soviet aid made the war possible. Le : Duan [secretary general of the Vietnamese : Communist Party] once told Mao Tse-tung that : if you help us, we are sure to win; if you : don't, we will still win, but we will have : to sacrifice one or two million more : soldiers to do so. : : : Q: Was the National Liberation Front an : independent political movement of South : Vietnamese? : : : A: No. It was set up by our Communist Party : to implement a decision of the Third Party : Congress of September 1960. We always said : there was only one party, only one army in : the war to liberate the South and unify the : nation. At all times there was only one : party commissar in command of the South. : : : Q: Why was the Ho Chi Minh trail so : important? : : : A: It was the only way to bring sufficient : military power to bear on the fighting in : the South. Building and maintaining the : trail was a huge effort, involving tens of : thousands of soldiers, drivers, repair : teams, medical stations, communication : units. : Q: What of American bombing of the Ho Chi : Minh trail? : : : A: Not very effective. Our operations were : never compromised by attacks on the trail. : At times, accurate B-52 strikes would cause : real damage, but we put so much in at the : top of the trail that enough men and weapons : to prolong the war always came out the : bottom. Bombing by smaller planes rarely hit : significant targets. : : : Q: What of American bombing of North : Vietnam? : : : A: If all the bombing had been concentrated : at one time, it would have hurt our efforts. : But the bombing was expanded in slow stages : under Johnson and it didn't worry us. We had : plenty of times to prepare alternative : routes and facilities. We always had : stockpiles of rice ready to feed the people : for months if a harvest were damaged. The : Soviets bought rice from Thailand for us. : : : Q: What was the purpose of the 1968 Tet : Offensive? : : : A: To relieve the pressure Gen. Westmoreland : was putting on us in late 1966 and 1967 and : to weaken American resolve during a : presidential election year. : : : Q: What about Gen. Westmoreland's strategy : and tactics caused you concern? : : : A: Our senior commander in the South, Gen. : Nguyen Chi Thanh, knew that we were losing : base areas, control of the rural population : and that his main forces were being pushed : out to the borders of South Vietnam. He also : worried that Westmoreland might receive : permission to enter Laos and cut the Ho Chi : Minh Trail. In January 1967, after : discussions with Le Duan, Thanh proposed the : Tet Offensive. Thanh was the senior member : of the Politburo in South Vietnam. He : supervised the entire war effort. Thanh's : struggle philosophy was that "America : is wealthy but not resolute," and : "squeeze tight to the American chest : and attack." He was invited up to Hanoi : for further discussions. He went on : commercial flights with a false passport : from Cambodia to Hong Kong and then to : Hanoi. Only in July was his plan adopted by : the leadership. Then Johnson had rejected : Westmoreland's request for 200,000 more : troops. We realized that America had made : its maximum military commitment to the war. : Vietnam was not sufficiently important for : the United States to call up its reserves. : We had stretched American power to a : breaking point. When more frustration set : in, all the Americans could do would be to : withdraw; they had no more troops to send : over. Tet was designed to influence American : public opinion. We would attack poorly : defended parts of South Vietnam cities : during a holiday and a truce when few South : Vietnamese troops would be on duty. Before : the main attack, we would entice American : units to advance close to the borders, away : from the cities. By attacking all South : Vietnam's major cities, we would spread out : our forces and neutralize the impact of : American firepower. Attacking on a broad : front, we would lose some battles but win : others. We used local forces nearby each : target to frustrate discovery of our plans. : Small teams, like the one which attacked the : U.S. Embassy in Saigon, would be sufficient. : It was a guerrilla strategy of hit-and-run : raids. : : : Q: What about the results? : : : A: Our losses were staggering and a complete : surprise;. Giap later told me that Tet had : been a military defeat, though we had gained : the planned political advantages when : Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run : for re-election. The second and third waves : in May and September were, in retrospect, : mistakes. Our forces in the South were : nearly wiped out by all the fighting in : 1968. It took us until 1971 to re-establish : our presence, but we had to use North : Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If : the American forces had not begun to : withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could : have punished us severely. We suffered badly : in 1969 and 1970 as it was. : : : Q: What of Nixon? : : : A: Well, when Nixon stepped down because of : Watergate we knew we would win. Pham Van : Dong [prime minister of North Vietnam] said : of Gerald Ford, the new president, : "he's the weakest president in U.S. : history; the people didn't elect him; even : if you gave him candy, he doesn't dare to : intervene in Vietnam again." We tested : Ford's resolve by attacking Phuoc Long in : January 1975. When Ford kept American B-52's : in their hangers, our leadership decided on : a big offensive against South Vietnam. : : : Q: What else? : : : A: We had the impression that American : commanders had their hands tied by political : factors. Your generals could never deploy a : maximum force for greatest military effect. : : : : : : : : :

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Message Thread: You've heard it all before so here it is again - Joe 9/29/2005, 7:50 pm Re: You've heard it all before so here it is again - Ronald Peters 1/4/2006, 8:15 am Re: You've heard it all before so here it is again - Joe 2/8/2006, 10:01 pm « Back to thread

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