Posted by Final Pt on 10/9/2004, 19:51:51, in reply to "Analysis: Terror In Uzbekistan" Conclusions As the debate over HT shows, serious disagreements persist among observers and analysts on the sources of political violence in Uzbekistan and the potential for further unrest. One group holds that Islamic fundamentalism represents a profound and growing threat to Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia; a second group charges that the government's repressive policies are at the root of the problem; a third group sees various conspiracies at work. While these differences defy neat resolution, they support two tentative conclusions. First, these basic issues have arisen before in the context of debates over Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere. For example, in "Face to Face with Political Islam," the French scholar Francois Burgat examines at length the interplay of state-sponsored violence and Islamic violence, as well as the radicalizing effect of throttled political expression, in such countries as Egypt and Algeria. Burgat is harshly critical of Arab regimes and their Western supporters, and he provides sympathetic insight into figures derided elsewhere as dangerous fanatics. Whether or not one agrees with Burgat's conclusions, his attempt to reveal the diversity of modern Islamist thought as expressed by its proponents in a variety of settings and his insistence on a hands-on familiarity with a region's languages, cultures, real-world socio-political concerns, and sense of its own history could serve as a valuable lesson in methodology for students of the problem in Central Asia. Similarly, research on Central Asia can surely benefit a broader community of scholars whose primary focus may lie elsewhere, but whose primary interest might well extend farther than they think. Second, the entrenched views on Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan have grown somewhat hidebound. Though the threat of an expansionist caliphate resurgent in the heart of Asia may make for stirring op-eds, precious little evidence suggests so great a peril. Even if all the anti-government political violence in Uzbekistan in 2004 was indeed the work of a single group motivated by a single Islamist ideology -- a supposition that remains to be proved -- that group has shown mainly that its lack of combat readiness is matched only by its seemingly total inability to convey any sort of meaningful ideological message or political platform. Given the obvious disparity in forces, analysts who have shown their acute awareness of the Islamic threat may well turn their acuity to other ills that afflict Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government's critics have long urged political liberalization in the face of mounting evidence that such liberalization is simply not in the cards. The necessity of reform, no matter how convincingly it is demonstrated, can never in and of itself guarantee reform. In order to avoid falling into pat diagnoses and unrealistic prescriptions -- "things are bad, and the government needs to do something to make it better" -- critics may want to consider alternative approaches to engagement, or a focus on other issues where fresh insights are more likely to emerge. The conspiracy theorists can hardly be expected to take an earnest recommendation at face value. They can, however, perform a useful function by rushing in, where others fear to tread, to sketch the outer limits of political possibility.
Another, equally conspiracy-minded, school of thought dismisses the importance of HT and places the onus on the Uzbek government. Tolib Yaqubov, who heads the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, told RFE/RL's Uzbek Service on 10 August, "Our position, the position of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, is clear, and we've expressed it since October 2000. All three terrorist acts, in 1999 and in subsequent years, are the work of Uzbekistan's own security services." Uzbek opposition journalist Anvar Usmanov expressed a related, albeit much more cautious, viewpoint, saying, "Note that [the Uzbek authorities] constantly accuse HT. For all practical purposes, the scapegoat has been found. Their agents have surely managed to infiltrate HT. Karimov is apparently taking advantage of this to incite anti-Islamic, anti-terrorist hysteria. That's why it seems to me that we should look at when the most recent series of explosions took place: when the Karimov government and the president himself came in for harsh criticism all over the world."
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