Understanding the genesis of the V-notch is particularly difficult because it can best be considered a prisoner’s dilemma game, a type of non-zero-sum game with a payoff structure that makes cooperation difficult. In a prisoner’s dilemma, all players have a dominant strategy to defect, even though the equilibrium outcome is worse than if they had played their dominated strategy. That is, if both players cooperate in V-notching, both get good rewards. If both defect, the result is low payoffs for both. Unfortunately, if one defects and the other does not, the defector gets a large reward and the other gets a low payoff. The high reward for defection motivates both players to defect, with the result that they get the worst of all possible payoffs. Defection dominates cooperation even though cooperation by both would bring higher payoffs, and a more efficient Nash equilibrium (Gardner 2003). This is the problem inherent in all collective action dilemmas (Elster 1989, Taylor 1990). In the case of the V-notch, individuals incur a cost in terms of the time it takes to cut the notch and put the lobster back in the water. However, they can be certain of no personal payoff. Under these circumstances, it is only rational to refuse to V-notch. Fortunately, however, many fishermen V-notch lobsters despite the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma. Why they engage in this cooperative behavior can only be understood by considering the costs and benefits involved.
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